New BSIP: MPLP (Margin Position Liquidity Pool) #182

无风险借贷的一个提案,暂时没有号,讨论中

这是老外的一个想法,但是里面参数太多。

我的方案虽然类似但是不同:

会不会造成锚定资产的流动性危机?记录:2020/03/12-2020/03/13市场流动性危机。

个人抵押率 CR BSIP77
维持抵押率 ICR BSIP77
爆仓抵押率 MCR BSIP77
借贷综合抵押率 LCR LCR=((抵押物+1p1)×价格)) /(债务-1p2) ,LCR>=MCR
借贷爆仓抵押率 LMCR LMCR为理事会设定参数,MSSR<LMCR<MCR
借贷池 P1 任何账户都可以将自己想要借出的资产放置到个人借贷池中,资产一旦被借将会被立即锁定,借贷池可以设置借贷利率。短期借贷的放入此池。个人可设置多个借贷池。UI设置排行榜。
预付息池 P2 借入人需要将自己的利息预付至预付息池中,借入资产前会检测预付息池中利息是否足够,如果足够将会立即扣息并借入。
借贷利率 i1 出借人设定借贷利率
借贷日期(日) LD 出借人可设定借出日期,付息以借出日期为周期。大于等于30日的借贷日期将会视为长期借贷。
利息手续费 i2 系统抽成每笔结算利息。
借贷物 1p1 bts
借贷物 1p2 bitasset
最少借贷物 i3 ((抵押物+1p1)×债仓)/((债仓 - 1p2)×抵押物)>= ICR/LMCR
锚定资产保险金 锚定资产区收取的利息费/爆仓费/市场手续费

出借人出借资产被锁定后,不能主动解锁。

没有进行借贷的,CR<MCR, 系统平仓

短借贷

  1. if CR<LMCR or 未及时付息, 中止借贷;

长借贷(大于=30日)

  1. if LCR<MCR, 系统拍卖;
  2. 提前七日付息,未及时预付息, if CR < MSSR, 系统拍卖 ; if CR >= MSSR, 中止借贷;
  3. 竞拍者只需要对利息进行竞拍;
  4. 中标者需要支付给出借人原借入人需要支付的月息或者季息(拍卖阶段为低息,需讨论套利者利用利息套利的情况),多出来的利息差系统与出借人8/2分成;
  5. 中标者会获得借入人的债仓,同时按照原约定到期付息;
  6. 竞拍周期为每15分钟一循环,最长持续时限48小时;
  7. CR < (LMCR+MSSR)/2,借入人不能主动关闭长期借贷。
风险处理:
  1. 如果CR<MSSR, 债仓会由智能资产管理账户临时接管并进行系统拍卖。
    竞拍人用利息竞拍成功后,需支付给借出人需要支付的月息或者季息,多出来的利息差系统与借出人8/2分成;
    长期借贷:如果48小时到期后,无人竞拍,债仓会流转至智能资产管理账户进行长期利息背仓。
  2. 流转至智能资产管理账户进行长期贷利息背仓, 由锚定资产保险金付息降杠杆提高抵押率慢慢平仓;
  3. 债仓CR>LMCR后,会出售债仓进行付息平仓操作。
  4. 锚定资产管理账户优先借贷锚定资产风险资金池,锚定资产风险资金池不参与外部借贷。

残留问题:

1.如果48小时拍卖期限到期后,无人竞拍,债仓会流转至智能资产管理账户进行利息背仓,由锚定资产手续费及竞拍利息差降杠杆提高抵押率。

当然这样也会存在问题,对于活跃的智能资产没有问题,对于流动性差的就有问题。

黑天鹅/债券:

当发生锚定资产手续费及竞拍利息差无法支付利息进行背仓或抵押池不足的情况 :

对应智能资产管理账户在预付息日发行风险债券,风险债券在bitasset交易对进行交易,7日到期后如果无法兑换到足够的锚定资产进行平仓,这部分债仓将会变成黑仓,黑仓仍可平仓,但是锚定资产区所有的收费的项目将不再进行派息分红,直到黑仓变成正常仓位。

风险债券的发行规模为:背负债仓的所需平仓的锚定资产规模;
风险债券的发行价格:1:1 锚定资产;
风险债券的赎回:按照实际收入进行利息+本金赎回;
风险债券赎回日期:不定期;
当然另外一个比较硬的方案是,风险债券强制1:1兑换;

2.竞拍规则的制定,预防投机倒把,利用系统漏洞强拍,抢拍:

因为ZB可以杠杆借币做空来挤爆抵押者,那么对应的方案应当是内盘抵押者可以借币或者锚定资产来提高共同抵押率来防止被挤爆,两者的共同点就是都需要给借贷者付息。

漏洞

漏洞1:如果拍卖过程中,快速下跌怎么处理?自动归到智能资产管理账户背仓?
漏洞2:比如从6块跌到1毛,这个债券需要偿还的时间就相当长,相当于5年或者更长时间的债券,此锚定资产所有的收入将会长时间用来保证债券的合理价值赎回。
漏洞3:如果有大量的bitasset在借贷池中被锁定,可能会造成流动性问题,但是似乎是被债仓锁的,问题的严重性需要考量。

例:

1.小红的抵押率 CR>1.6;
2.价格下跌;
3.小红的抵押率无限接近于MCR=1.55,就要爆仓了;
4.小红此时可以从小明借贷智能资产/bts来保证她的债仓在大于借贷爆仓抵押率(也就是她自己的抵押率CR)>=MCR(或者其它由理事会设定的参数)的情况下不会被强平,同时保证自己+借贷来的债仓的综合抵押率必须大于ICR;
5.小红不能动用从小明借贷的资产;
6.小红必须提前支付给小明利息;
7.价格又跌了;
8.小红的抵押率无限接近与LMCR,如果她不增加抵押率或者还一部分款的使自己的借贷爆仓抵押率LMCR的话,一旦小于LMCR或者自己+借贷来的债仓的综合抵押率小于LCR,她就会被系统强制平仓;
9.小红一旦被触发强平,从小明借贷的资产将会归还给小明;
10.利息由市场决定;
11.如果小明借贷给小红资产,在借贷时间没有到期或者小红没有主动终止合约或者小红没有被强平之前,小明不能撤回资产;
12.小明借贷出的资产,将会锁定在自己账户的借贷池中;
13.利息类型的支付可以按照抵押物的类型进行决定;
14.没有进行这样借贷的抵押者如果CR<MCR, 就会直接被系统强平。

当然这个简单的方案是一个比较保险的方法: 持有智能资产及bts的用户都可以去借贷获利,变相的staking.


老外的翻译

BSIP: 
Title: Debt Asset Feature - MPLP (Margin Position Liquidity Pool)
Author: [bench] <https://github.com/froooze>
Status: Draft
Type: Protocol
Created: 2019-08-27
Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/182

Abstract

  1. The MPLP enables a lower maintenance collateral ratio (mcr) with mcr < MCR and mcr > 1 by borrowing extra debt asset with interest.
  2. The liquidity pool enables the debt asset holder to earn interest through lending.
  3. The internal maintenance collateral ratio (mcr) is changed, but not the internal collateral ratio (cr).
  4. When extra debt asset is removed mcr = MCR again.

Motivation

  • No motivation to create bitAssets #189
  • Liquidity is eaten away by BTS shorter and not used to increase the CR of debt holder #181
  • Increasing CR only possible, when collateral is increased or debt is reduced
  • Low balance of the shorting asset by the shorter
  • Small price decrease triggers margin call wall and suppresses price further
  • Increasing MSSR does also increase premium, selling pressure and penalty

Rationale

  • Minimize margin calls
  • Increase circulating supply of debt asset, without increasing system risk

Definitions

  • CR = (debt-extra debt asset)/collateral`(external collateral ratio)
  • CR:抵押物/(债务-额外借贷物)(外部抵押率)
  • MCR = maintenance CR or margin call CR
  • MCR=维持抵押率或者强平抵押率
  • ICR = initial CR (amount to borrow from liquidity pool and blockchain)
  • ICR=初始抵押率(从流动池及区块链可借的数量)
  • cr = debt/collateral (internal collateral ratio)
  • cr:抵押物/债务(内部抵押率)
  • mcr = internal maintenance cr = target cr (user based)
  • mcr:内部维持抵押率
  • min mcr(MCR, ICR, lp1, lp3)
  • 最小内部维持抵押率(MCR, ICR,1p1,1p3)
  • extra debt asset = (ICR - cr) * collateral
  • 额外债务:(ICR-cr)×抵押物
  • interest = extra debt asset * a * (1/cr)^b * interest rate
  • 利息=额外债务×a×(1/cr)^b *利息率
  • interest balance -= interest
  • 利益余额=利息
  • insurance pool += interest * interest fee
  • 保险池+=利息×利息手续费
  • interest lender = interest * (1 - interest fee)
  • 利息出借人=利息×(1-利息手续费)
  • interest balance lender += interest lender
  • 利息余额出借人+=利息出借人

Boundaries

Margin Position Holder 债仓持有者

  • cr > 1
  • mcr > 1
  • interest balance > interest
  • 利息余额>利息
  • 1 > interest fee > 0
  • 1> 利息手续费>0

Liquidity Pool 流动池

  • cr ≤ 1 (t=0)
  • crmcr (t>0)

Solution

  • The MPLP or liquidity pool reduces margin calls by lowering the mcr without adding extra BTS or decrease the debt of the position
  • MPLP 或者 流动池 通过降低 mcr 减少了强平,而不需要增加额外的bts或者平掉仓位。
  • The user has the option to increase the CR by locking the extra debt asset next to debt, without paying the current debt back
  • 用户可以选择通过锁定额外的债务来增加CR,而不需要平掉当前债仓。

Pools 池子

  • For every debt asset, there is a separated liquidity pool
  • Every liquidity pool has a reward pool, which collects the interest lender
  • Every liquidity pool has a insurance pool, which is financed by the interest fee
  • 每一个借贷资产,都有一个单独的流动池
  • 每一个流动池都有一个奖励池,用来收集利息出借人
  • 每一个流动池都有一个保险池,由利息手续费资助。

Timing

  • Every liquidity pool has a certain time threshold, which defines the max. linear removing rate by the lender
  • The borrower can remove extra debt asset instantly by setting mcr = MCR
  • The time thresholds defines, how long a borrower has to pay the interest in front
  • 每一个流动池都有一个时间阈值,其由借出者决定最大。线性移动率。
  • 借入人可以通过设置mcr=MCR快速移除额外债务。
  • 时间阈值决定,借入人需要提前多长时间付息。

Interest 利息

  • Interest rate is defined by supply/demand of (lp1+lp2+lp3)/(lp1+lp2)
  • Interest is paid in the debt asset. Lender can decide, if he wants to get paid in debt asset or settled debt asset (BTS)
  • Interest is paid from a new interest balance, which must be held in the corresponding debt asset
  • When integrated (Δt) Interest is as big, as the last paid interest, new interest must be paid to cover the interest for time threshold and current cr
  • 利息率由供给/需求决定:(lp1+lp2+lp3)/(lp1+lp2)
  • 利息支付类型由借出物决定。出借人可以决定,如果他想要获得借出物或者抵押物(bts)。
  • 利息从一个新的利息余额支付,其必须持有对应的借出物。
  • 当综合(Δt)利息太大,当最新支付利息时,新的利息必须支付来覆盖满足因时间阈值及当前cr要求的利息

Liquidity Pool Portion流动池部分

Sub pools辅助池

  • lp1 is for users with mcr < MCR
  • lp2is for users with CR < ICR
  • lp3 is available debt asset
  • lp1mcr < MCR的用户使用
  • lp2CR < ICR的用户使用
  • lp3:可用的借贷物

Distribution分类

  • The lp2 must be first fully filled, before mcr < MCR

  • mcr < MCR前, lp2 必须首先装满;

  • The lp1 can only increase, when lp3> 0

  • lp3> 0,lp1只能增加;

  • The lp1 is distributed, to enable everyone the same min mcr

  • lp1分布完后,使任何人的有同样的min mcr

  • Lender removes debt asset from liquidity pool: If lp3> debt asset than Δlp3 = debt asset If lp3= 0 than Δlp1 = debt asset/time threshold (linear removed)

  • 出借人从流动池移除借贷物:

    iflp3>借贷物

    than Δlp3=借贷物

    if lp3= 0

    than Δlp1=借贷物/时间阈值(线性移动)

Margin Call Gap

  • ICR > MCR
  • The ICR must be different from MCR to increase demand in liquidity pool before margin call gets active
  • 在强平激活前,ICR必须不同于MCR以增加在流动池的需求
  • Every liquidity pool user increases demand from the liquidity pool until CRICR
  • 每一个流动池用户增加来自流动池的需求直到 CRICR
  • Margin calls happen for liquidity pool and non-liquidity pool users, when CR < MCR
  • 强平发生在流动池及没有流动池的用户,当其 CR<MCR

Margin Calls 强平

  • prioritized by cr
  • 优先由cr决定
  • reduce collateral, debt, debt asset and demand for extra debt asset
  • 减少抵押物,债务,借贷物,需求额外借贷物。

Partial 1部分1

  • if cr > 1 and cr < mcr
  • than sell collateral to reach crmcr

Partial 2 部分2

  • if interest balance < interest
  • than mcr = MCR and sell collateral to reach CRMCR

Full全部

  • if cr ≤ 1
  • than sell all collateral

The full margin call does change the ownership of the collateral, extra debt asset and interest to the liquidity pool.

全部强平将会改变抵押物,额外抵押物及流动池利息的所有权。

The remaining debt/debt asset is covered by the insurance pool.

剩余的 债务/借贷物 将会被保险池覆盖

Recovery 恢复

  • cr = mcr

The MPLP allows during a full margin call, to get the margin position with extra funds back. The cr needs to be increased with extra collateral or debt asset to mcr. This is only possible until all collateral is sold.

MPLP允许在一次全部强平过程中,用额外的资产来获得被强平的仓位。cr需要用额外的抵押物或者借贷物增加至mcr。这只有抵押物没有被全部卖出才可能发生。

System Risk

Parameters

  • ICR
  • MCR
  • a & b
  • interest fee

Insurance pool

insurance pool` += (`ICR` - `cr`) * `collateral`  * `a` * (1/`cr`)^`b`  * `interest fee` *  `interest rate

The insurance pool covers the system risk, when:

  • mcr < MCR
  • cr < MCR
  • cr ≤ 1

Example

  • Total supply: 3 million bitUSD (100%)
  • Total supply in the liquidity pool: 0.6 million bitUSD (20%)
  • Interest rate for 14 days (= time threshold): 2%
  • a = 10, b = 7
  • interest balance = 4 bitUSD
  • ICR = 1.55 | MCR = 1.5

Stage 1

  • BTS price: 0.05 bitUSD
  • 10k BTS as collateral
  • 323 bitUSD debt
  • CR = 1.55

Stage 2

  • BTS price drop to 0.04 bitUSD
  • CR = cr = 1.24

Stage 3

  • 65 bitUSD are needed to reach ICR again
  • Interest: 65 bitUSD * 10 * (1/1.24)⁷ * 2% = 2.88 bitUSD
  • interest balance = 1.12 bitUSD

Stage 4

  • The 65 bitUSD gets locked to the margin position, without paying back the 323 bitUSD debt
  • 10k BTS as collateral
  • 323 bitUSD debt
  • 65 bitUSD extra asset balance
  • 258 bitUSD overall debt
  • CR = 1.55

Stage 5

After 14 days the 65 bitUSD balance gets removed from extra asset balance, if the user doesn’t add extra funds to interest balance. Chances to get are margin call are now high because CR gets now reduced to cr.

Conclusion

  • Without borrowing from the liquidity pool, the user needs to sell 1178 BTS to cover the MCR
  • With the liquidity pool only 2.88 bitUSD are needed, to cover the interest for CR increase to ICR

Comparison

Case MPLP MPL BSIP-70
Motivation interest rate market fee interest rate
Borrower peer blockchain peer
Input debt asset BTS/every asset every asset
Purpose increase CR & debt increase liquidity lending/trading
Collateral no no yes
Order book no no yes
  • In a bear market the interest lender for the liquidity pool should be higher than BSIP-70
  • In a bull market the interest lender for the liquidity pool should be lower than BSIP-70

Discussion and Summary for Shareholders

The MPLP provides a free market solution to evaluate the best CR in terms of risk/reward or cost/reward based on the market liquidity. The MPLP enables a voluntary extra risk level for margin position holders, which is fully compatible to our current market mechanics. The amount of debt, which can be borrowed from blockchain and the system risk is here not increased.

Negative Feedback Loops

Proof of stake

The possibility to stake debt asset and profit from the interest, will increase supply of debt asset and demand for BTS. A lot of successful coins have staking options, which is still missing in the BitShares ecosystem.

CR and Debt increase

Because the user gets a third option to increase CR from the liquidity pool with extra asset balance, no debt needs to be paid back.

Interest Rate

The liquidity pool tries to find a fair market price for the inequity of debt asset distribution. A higher interest rate means more inequity, which results in a higher debt asset supply for the liquidity pool.

Market Liquidity

Markets with lower liquidity have a higher value for min mcr, a, b and interest fee.

Worker Cost Reduction

Worker payments are hold in bitFIAT. The option to earn interest on bitFIAT, does reduce the worker costs and demand for BTS from the reserve pool.

See also

Changes

  • Proof of stake topic added
  • Changed topic from settlement fund to margin position liquidity pool
  • Removed settlement
  • Added interest rate
  • Removed margin call fees
  • CR and debt increase topic added
  • Worker cost reduction topic added
  • Example topic added
  • Comparison topic added
  • Margin call gap topic added
  • Goals topic added
  • Definition topic added
  • Boundaries topic added
  • Interest balance added
  • internal CR = cr added
  • Margin call topic added
  • interest parameters a & b added
  • System risk topic added
  • Abstract topic added
  • Market liquidity topic added
  • Introduced ICR/MCR instead of MCR/CCR (Call CR)
  • Recovery topic for full margin call added

Copyright

This document is placed in the public domain.

1赞

首先来说我没完全看懂。
也没有看出来这样有多大的好处。
大户可以找专业人士解释条款并找到套利的姿势。散户想赚点利息估计很难。
直接提高TCR至2以上不是更简单粗暴吗?
再说了,还有一个目标抵押率可以用啊。也不至于爆仓。
暴仓单之所以那么多,我看绝大部分都是故意爆仓的。

好处不是看出来的,是用出来的。

只需要知道这是staking就行了。

而且到时候用户不需要知道这么多参数,只需知道可以staking无风险生息,及抵押者借贷后会在一定条件下不爆仓就行。

大户在市场中永远都是占据有利位置的,有些事情就死心吧。

1.小红的抵押率 CR>1.6;
2.价格下跌;
3.小红的抵押率无限接近于MCR=1.55,就要爆仓了;
4.小红此时可以从小明借贷智能资产/bts来保证她的债仓在大于借贷爆仓抵押率(也就是她自己的抵押率CR)>=MCR(或者其它由理事会设定的参数)的情况下不会被强平,同时保证自己+借贷来的债仓的综合抵押率必须大于ICR;
——————————————————————————————
插针的情况下已经爆仓了。根本不会给你借的时间。

想要给予散户红利或者挖矿收益其实很简单,手续费多少比列每月或者每年快照发就可以了。
搞那么多技术性的东西不一定适用。
对于技术员来说能给你说出一堆参数、指标等等证明他们确实做了实实在在的事情。
用户在使用中然并卵

你非要等到别人插针爆你,那神仙也救不了你:man_shrugging:

搞不清楚你到底在讲什么或者想表达什么:man_shrugging:

插针的情况随时都可能发生。这个不得不考虑进去。
以现在1.6的抵押率1.55的强平。不用插针啊 只需要稍微大点的波动就强平了。
还根本不用插针。
任何提议都是出于好意,任何改动都不一定是正确的。一个人甚至一个团队考虑的东西始终都是片面的。
所以还是建议在做改动前能推演一下。让无数的用户按照自己的喜好和利益点操作。经过大量推演出来的方案也不完全 正确。但至少可以把错误降低到最小。

1.6波动到1.55需要价格变多少?!贴着线抵押被一下波爆了能埋怨谁哪?!加着喂价改革后的保护都能波爆了,真的不能埋怨谁……再者也不是为了贴线抵押服务的……

任何提案都是一个人或者团队提出来的,都是需要反复讨论与投票的,怎么就说的都是片面的?!

你自然可以把你推演的结果拿出来补缺,又没说过不尊重持有者的意见……

反复讨论和投票大部分都是经由利益考量。有多少是为BTS本身前途考虑的这点还存疑。
大众推演可以起到多样化操作的目的。检测各种操作产生的连锁反应。
我一直有关注BTS不过并不知道有测试链。也不知道怎么使用。也没有测试奖励,明显缺乏全民测试的动力。

……你说的真的让我无言以对……
POS甚至于DPOS的本质难道你还不清楚吗?
如果你对这点都存疑,那我就真的不好说什么了。

能大众推演自然非常好,谁都希望能够大众推演。
但有些东西让大众推演是不切实际的。
如果你对测试链进行大众推演有切实的想法可以去找欧洲团队聊聊,这边无能为力呵。

关于全民测试我也有一个想法,
建立一个虚拟盘。
每个注册用户送100虚拟BTS。
N倍流水+多长期限后不管盈亏都能获得剩余的BTS转换成真的,
期间套利成功的给予其他奖励。具体事务再做细化。
这样还能起到推广作用。让很多不知BTS运作的人也能参与进来。
如果能同步建一个虚拟的ZB站出来作为外盘参考更好。

不懂鸟语也没渠道联系欧洲团队。如果可能你考虑一下提交到团队讨论。